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Introduction
As the above quote implies, as long as there are states, there are bound to be wars.
History has certainly borne that out, particularly in the last century, with two state-centric world wars and over 50 million deaths in World War II alone. 2 Although the states engaged in these conflicts reflected various forms and styles of government, ranging from dictatorships to democracies, most possessed an element of civilian leadership and a subordinate military force.
Carl von Clausewitz, the great German war theorist of the 1800s, wrote with depth and insight concerning the relationship between the statesman and the military commander. Interestingly, his ideas apply uniformly regardless of the style of government that frames its civil-military relationship. As such, the lessons learned from a dictatorship like Nazi Germany can be applied to an American democracy today. This dialogue is particularly important as the statesman begins to contemplate military action. One of the statesman's first responsibilities is to establish the political objective for which the war is to achieve. The commander must be a part of this process to ensure the "designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with the means." In other words, the commander must inform the statesman if the political objective is attainable through the use of military force. If not, the political objective may need to be modified. 4 Once the political objective is determined, the next step is to define the nature of the war. According to Clausewitz, this stems from the original motives for war and can range from "political existence" (national survival) to supporting "an alliance that no longer seems to reflect the state's true interests." 5 Consequently, "not every war need be fought until one side collapses." 6 Therefore, the level of effort and intensity will vary depending upon the motive or nature of the war. Next, the military objective and the means are determined. These two items form the basis for military strategy, and are largely defined by the political objective. Clausewitz captures this idea by stating, "The political object-the original motive for war-will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires." 7 As such, the statesman and the commander should ensure the military objective and the means remain congruent with the political objective. Once done, the next step is strategy development where the means are applied in coherent ways to achieve the military objective. From that effort comes campaign planning where specific engagements and battles are defined. To this, Clausewitz states, "Policy of course, will not extend its influence to operational details," but it can be felt "in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle."
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The bottom line is that any major military development considered by the commander should be reviewed by the statesman to determine potential policy implications.
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Once the political objective has been communicated and the corresponding military objectives and strategy defined, care must be taken to ensure these overarching elements remain congruent with one another as the war progresses. Clausewitz is very clear on this point. The
military cannot be handed a political objective with unrestrained authority to pursue it. Civilian leadership must retain oversight-the political object "must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow." 10 Not only can the political objective change during war, but so can the military objectives and strategy. Clausewitz simply states, "that in war many roads lead to success." 11 But each "road" must draw its origin from the political objective. For that reason, the commander "must also be a statesman" to understand the changing political situation and to realize "exactly how much he can achieve with the means at his disposal." 12 As is the case in pre-war planning, the statesman must know "the instrument it means to use." Clausewitz adds, "If policy reads the course of military events correctly, it is wholly and exclusively entitled to decide which events and trends are best for the objectives of the war." Congress, "Once war is forced upon us, there is no alternative but to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end." He felt strongly that once war began, the commander should be given broad latitude to prosecute the war unimpeded by policy. 32 President Johnson, at the other end of the spectrum, participated in selecting targets for the air attack in Vietnam in order to influence the war at the tactical level. 33 Personalities can break the system. The message for American commanders and statesmen alike is to understand each other's roles and responsibilities, and acknowledge where the expertise lies.
As for America's command structure, the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments, such as the Goldwaters-Nichols Act, provided key enhancements to strengthen Clausewitz's dictums on civil-military relations. 34 Requiring the responsible commander-in-chief to report directly to the National Command Authority is exactly what Clausewitz had in mind, but
Clausewitz also noted the inherent challenge of the commander remaining cognizant of policy.
Making the commander a member of the cabinet was a suggestion; however, Clausewitz explained how difficult it would be to take the cabinet to the commander during time of war. 35 An American solution to that problem was the creation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This move created as closely as possible a person who is both a commander and statesman, whose role is to facilitate the dialogue that ensures policy and war remain congruent. Clausewitz would likely be most impressed with America's approach to civil-military relations, but then again, it can be argued that it was his idea in the first place. 
